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695 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1982».
By its decision in Whitehead, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has held that occupants of overnight train sleeping compartments do not
have the same expectation of privacy as
individuals in their homes or hotel rooms.
Additionally, the. court has stated that
where such diminished expectation exists,
the importance of the law enforcement
interests at stake and the "minimal intrusiveness" of the search abrogate the
requirement of probable cause under the
fourth amendment. As a result of this ruling, the court of appeals has not only redefined the privacy interests of individuals
travelling by train, but it appears to justify
the abrogation of probable cause as a prerequisite to a canine sniff search for contraband by endorsing the use of police
profiles to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

- Virginia Manno Harasti
Mills v. Maryland: SUPREME COURT
RULES TIIAT MARTIANO'S CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATORY
In Mills 'V. Maryland, _U.S.---O 108 S.
Ct. 1860 (1988), the Supreme Court of the
United States, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a
Maryland Court of Appeals death sentence
affirmation on the ground that the jury
verdict form used was unconstitutional.
Ralph Mills, an inmate in the Maryland
Correctional Institution, was convicted by
a jury of the first degree murder of his
cellmate, Paul Brown. At the conclusion
of the sentencing hearings, the same jury,
using the verdict form provided for in Md.
Rule Proc. 772A, found beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance
had been proven; namely, that the "defendant committed the murder at a time
when he was confined in a correctional
institution." Id. at 1871. Equally important, the jury found none of the mitigating
circumstances provided for in Rule 772A
had been proved by a preponderance of
the evidence. Consequently, the jury had
marked "no" beside each of the eight
mitigating circumstances listed on the verdict form. Accordingly, as required by the
Maryland Capital Punishment Statute,
Md. Ann. Code, art. 27 § 413 (1987 Repl.
Vol.), the jury handed down a sentence of
death.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, petitioner argued that the statute, in conjuction with the jury instructions and the verdict form, was

unconstitutional in that jury unanimity
was required to find the presence or
absence of an aggravating circumstance,
but not required to find the absence of any
mitigating circumstances. Therefore, a sentence of death could result in a situation
where the jury unanimously found an
aggravating circumstance, but could not
agree on the presence of anyone specific
mitigating circumstance, even if all twelve
agreed that some mitigating factors existed.
Id. at 1865. Conversely, even if eleven of
the jurors agreed to the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance, the failure
of the remaining juror to agree to the same
circumstance may result in the jury marking the verdict form "no" in regard to that
particular circumstance.
The court of appeals rejected this argument, and concluded that the requirement
of unanimity imposed by the statute
applied not only to a finding of the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance, but also to a finding of the
absence of any mitigating circumstance.
The Court found that the verdict form
should be read as requiring unanimity for
"no" answers as well as "yes" answers.
Furthermore, they found that the trial
judge's instructions to the jury stressed the
need for unanimity on all of the issues presented. Id. at 1864. Therefore, the Court
concluded that a finding by anyone juror
of a mitigating circumstance was sufficient
to compel the jury to weigh this factor
against any aggravating circumstance.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized, however, that the statute did not
provide a procedure to be followed when
unanimity could not be reached. Thus,
pursuant to its authority to fill gaps in the
sentencing process, as provided by §
413(1), they directed that if the jury could
not agree unanimously on the acceptance
or rejection of any mitigating circumstances, it should leave that answer
blank and proceed to the balancing phase.
Id. at 1864.
The Supreme Court initially noted the
importance of mitigating factors in capital
cases, stating that "the sentencer may not
refuse to consider or be precluded from
considering any relevant evidence."
Eddings 'V. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
With this proposistion in mind, the Court
proceeded to analyze "whether petitioner's interpretation of the sentencing process is one a reasonable jury could have
drawn from the instructions given by the
trial judge and from the verdict form
employed in this case." Mills at 1866.
The strength of Mill's argument rested
on the possibility that alternate grounds
existed for the sentence of death. If the
jury adopted the interpretation favored by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, then it
only marked "no" on the verdict form
when all twelve of the jurors agreed that
the mitigating circumstances were not proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. Conversely, if the jury adopted the
approach advanced by the petitioner, then
the marking of "no", only indicated a failure to unanimOUsly agree to the existence
of a particular mitigating circumstance.
Thus, the jury would be precluded from
considering mitigating factors that some
jurors found to exist. The Supreme Court
said, "[U]nless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury may have
rested its verdict on the 'improper'
ground, we must remand for resentencing." Id. at 1867.
They decided that the two crucial factors to be considered were the judge's
instructions to the jury regarding the verdict form stipulated by Md. Rule Proc.
772A, and the verdict form itself. Regarding the jury instructions, the Court found
that while the trial judge repeatedly stressed the need for unanimity concerning the
finding of both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, he failed to stress that the
answer of "no" to either one also required
a unanimous fmding. Thus, the Court
determined that it was possible that the
jury made the inference that the "no"
answer is merely a failure to unanimously
agree on the existence of a particular circumstance,
either
aggravating
or
mitigating, not a unanimous finding that
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circumstances were not proven. Additionally, there was nothing in the trial judge's
instruction to indicate that the jury had
the third option advanced by the court of
appeals; namely, to leave the answer blank
when a unanimous finding of either "yes"
or "no" could not be reached and then
proceed to the balancing phase. Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that it was
possible that a jury following the trial
judge's instructions could be precluded
from considering possible relevant
mitigating circumstances, "if even a single
juror adhered to the view that such a factor should not be so considered." Id. at
1868.
Regarding the verdict from itself, the
Supreme Court found persuasive the fact
that subsequent to the decision below, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland had found
it necessary to promulgate a new verdict
form, which expressly made provisions for
the jury to find that not all twelve jurors
agree on the existence or nonexistence of a
particular mitigating circumstance. This
new form also expressly makes provisions
for such findings to be included in the balancing portion of the sentencing. The
Court also noted that in the two cases tried
before juries which used the new verdict
form, both juries reported non-unanimous
votes.
Consequently, the Court found
that there is a substantial possibility
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving
the judge's instructions in this case,
and in attempting to complete the verdict form as instructed, well may have
thought they were precluded from
considering any mitigating evidence
unless all twelve jurors agreed on the
existence of a particular such circumstance.
Id. at 1870.
The Court therefore determined that the
death sentence, which was upheld by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, must be
vacated and the case remanded for
resentencing.
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy, concluded that the charges
of the trial judge to the jury were reasonably sufficient to emphasize the need for
unanimity on all the issues involved,
including the existence or nonexistence of
mitigating circumstances. Furthermore,
the dissent noted that the reworking of the
verdict form was not evidence that the
form itself was improper, since "a sentencing instruction that is constitutionally
acceptable may be improved in any
number of ways." Id. at 1874 n.2.
A sentence of death places a heavy burden on the court system to regulate the

procedure by which it may be imposed.
The decision of the Supreme Court in
Mins illustrates not only the careful scrutiny that the imposistion of such sentence
demands, but also the controversial questions that face the courts when protecting
the constitutional rights of a person accused of a capital offense.

-Gregory]. Swain

McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin:
NO-MERIT BRIEF PROVIDED TO
TIlE COURT BY COURT
APPOINTED APPELlATE
COUNSEL DOES NOT VIOLATE
INDIGENT'S SIXTH AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS
In McCoy v. Court ofAppeals of Wiscon·
sin, _U.S.-o 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988), the
United States Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's no-merit brief rule, by which
court-appointed counsel must prepare for
the court a statement of why particular
cases, statutes, or facts in the record lead
him to believe his client's appeal is without
merit, is consitutional under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In so holding,
the Court indicates that counsel's role as
an officer of the court is at least as important, if not more important, than his role
as an advocate and essentially places the
attorney in the position of decision-maker.
A Wisconsin trial judge found the appellant, an indigent, guilty of abduction and
sexual assault and sentenced him to twelve
years in prison. Appellant then filed an
appeal and the court appointed a lawyer to
represent him. The attorney, after reviewing the case, advised appellant that an
appeal would be useless. Rule 809.32(1) of
the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
H [a court-appointed attorney] is of the
opinion that further appellate proceedings on behalf of the defendant would
be frivolous and without any arguable
merit within the meaning of A nders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the
attorney shall file with the court of
appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is
stated anything in the record that
might arguably support the appeal and

court with a discussion of why he believed
those arguments were without merit,
claiming such action would contravene
Anders and violate the appellant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. McCay at
1898. Since the brief did not fully comply
with Rule 809.32(1), the court ordered it
stricken and told the attorney to submit a
conforming brief. Instead, counsel sought
a declaratory judgment in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, asking the court to
declare unconstitutional that portion of
the rule which requires the attorney to discuss why the issue lacks merit. Id. at 1899.
In upholding the rule, the Wisconsin court
and the Supreme Court both relied on and
expanded upon Anders.
The petitioner in Anders was convicted
of the felony of possession of marijuana.
Counsel was appointed to represent him
on appeal; however, after reviewing the
record, the attorney advised his client and
the court that the appeal was without
merit. After petitioner's request for a new
attorney was denied, he proceeded to represent himself on appeal, but his conviction was affirmed. Six years later,
petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in
the Supreme Court of California, asking
the courts to reopen his case because he
had been denied the right to counsel on his
appeal. Both petitions were denied.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held
that California's procedure, by which
court-appointed counsel can withdraw
from an appeal merely by furnishing the
court with a letter in which counsel states
that the appeal lacks merit, "does not comport with fair procedure and lacks that
equality that is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Anders at 741. Although
the no-merit letter alerts the court of
potentially frivolous litigation, it gives no
basis for counsel's conclusion and fails to
notify appellant of potential arguments in
support of reversal.
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a discussion of why the issue lacks merit.
(Emphasis added).
Counsel partially complied with the rule
by submitting arguments in support of the
appeal, stating his belief that the arguments were without merit, and asking for
permission to withdraw from the case.
Counsel failed, however, to provide the
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